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In the federal courts and in the courts of over
twenty American states, evidence illegally obtained
by law-enforcement officers cannot be received in
a criminal prosecution, provided the accused
objects to its admission." Under the exclusionary
rule if the residence quarters of a kidnapper are
illegally searched by the police, the most incrimi-
nating evidence found therein, including such
items as copies of ransom notes actually sent or
the clothing of the victim, could not be used in a
diminal proceeding against the kidnapper.2
Whether such a rule can be defended in principle
and whether it operates to discourage illegal
police practices are the questions posed by this
discussion.
At the outset it should be recognized that the
evidence which may not be introduced is as trust-
worthy and reliable as any which may be
considered in court. The evidence is kept out of
the trial not because it is unworthy of belief,
but because it is the product of police methods
which violate the law.
The exclusionary evidence rule says nothing
about the content of the law governing the police.
I The jurisdictions are listed in MORGAN, MAGJIE
& WzrusmN, CASES A MATERIAS ON EvmENcE
745 (1957).
2 Some states apply the exclusionary rule only in
certain classes of cases. In Alabama, evidence illegally
obtained from a dwelling house is excluded in the trial
of certain alcohol control cases. ALA. CODE tit. 29, §210
(Supp. 1959). In Maryland, illegally obtained evidence
is inadmissible in misdemeanor cases except that such
evidence is admissible in prosecutions for carrying a
concealed weapon. Also, in certain counties of Mary-
land, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in gambling
cases and, in a slightly different list of counties, the
rule is inapplicable in lottery cases. MD. CODE ANN.
art. 35, 15. See Salhburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545
(1954). In Michigan, article 2, §10, of the state constitu-
tion provides that the exclusionary rule, otherwise
applicable, shall not bar from evidence certain items
listed therin.
" If there is merit in the arguments of this paper, .e.,
that the exclusionary rule does work to deter police
misconduct, these compromises must be based upon a
judgment that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule is a value outweighed by the value of securing
convictions in some kinds of cases.
It takes no position with respect to which arrests,
searches and seizures, or other enforcement actions
are legal or illegal. To defend the rule is not to
defend any particular formulation regulating the
activities of law enforcement. One can support the
rule and still support the proposition that wire-
tapping ought to be permitted in certain circum-
stances under certain safeguards. One can support
the rule and still hold that the present law of
arrest, formed as it was before the appearance of
modem professional police forces, is outmoded and
requires drastic reformulation. The rule merely
states the consequences of a breach of whatever
principles might be adopted to control law enforce-
ment officers.
Police officers are not controlled more rigorously
by the exclusionary evidence rule than they are
by force of their own respect for the law. If police
obey the rules set by the community to govern
police practice, they obviously will not obtain
evidence illegally. The point is often missed. The
chief of police* of Los Angeles, writing after
California adopted the exclusionary rule, stated
that the "ability to prevent the commission of
crimes has been greatly diminished. ' 3 He meant to
suggest that the diminution occurred because he
would have to comply with the California decision.
Yet, that decision merely adopted the exclusionary
rule in California; it did not change the substantive
law of arrest or search at all. If the decision dimin-
ished the effectiveness of law enforcement in
California, it did so by securing obedience to the
law in a manner which influenced the police.
Nor are the police alone in falling into the error.
Professor Edward Barrett has recently written:
"The interplay between the exclusionary rule
and the rule that searches must be justified as
incidental to valid arrests presents the danger of
two undesirable side effects. Pressure may be
placed on the police to make arrests too early
in the investigative process. Pressure may be
'PARxER, POLICE 117 (Wilson ed. 1957).
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placed on the courts to water down the standards
for probable cause to make formal arrests in
order to avoid freeing obviously guilty defendants
because of relatively minor invasions of their
privacy."
4
The pressure to arrest in order to search exists
not because of the exclusionary rule, but because
the law governing police conduct prohibits a
search without a warrant, unless the search is in-
cident to a valid arrest. The "side effects" referred
to by Professor Barrett would, I submit, be ob-
served in the operation of any sanction severe
enough to deter the police. If courts were called
upon to impose mandatory jail sentences or large
fines upon officers guilty of minor violations of the
rules, these side effects would be present. One can
imagine judges who would place heavy burdens on
the "technical" violator but who would not free the
accused because of the violation, but I doubt that
such judges exist in reality. Whenever the rules are
enforced by meaningful sanctions, our attention
is drawn to their content. The comfort of Free-
dom's words spoken in the abstract is always dis-
turbed by their application to a contested instance.
Any rule of police regulation enforced in fact
will generate pressures to weaken the rule.
One further preliminary observation: The point
is often made that the exclusionary rule should be
rejected because the law of search and seizure
and the law of arrest are filled with technicalities
and inconsistencies. This point too, goes to the
content of the rules rather than to the remedy.
If the rules are unrealistic or unprincipled they
ought to be changed. One may note that the
California Supreme Court, in cases applying the
exclusionary rule after its adoption, has greatly
broadened the power of the police to search and
to make arrests. 5
Any fair-minded observer will find the case
against excluding illegal evidence an impressive
one.
Under the rule, a great many obviously guilty
people must be acquitted. If the tainted evidence
is barred from trial, the prosecution will frequently
fail to carry its considerable burden of proof.
The aim is to deter law enforcement officers from
' Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the
Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46, 65.
6 Comment, The Cahan Case: The Interpretation and
Operation of the Exclusionary Rule in California,
4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 252 (1957); Comment, Two Years
uith the Cahan Rude, 9 STAN. L. REV. 515 (1957);
Comment, Search and Seizure: A Review of the Cases
since People v. Cahan, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 50 (1957).
violating individual rights; however, the rule does
not impose money damages or loss of liberty upon
the offending officers, nor does it provide com-
pensation for persons injured by official over-
reaching. Opponents have often emphasized the
startling result achieved under the rule: to deter
the police both the guilty defendant and the
law-breaking officer go unpunished. As Judge
Cardozo once put it, "The criminal is to go free
because the constable blundered."' By freeing the
criminal to return to his trade, the argument goes,
the rule punishes not the official law-breaker,
but rather the law-abiding citizen.
7
The rule gives an ordinary policeman the power
to confer immunity upon an offender. By over-
stepping the bounds of the law, a policeman's
action can place vital evidence beyond the reach
of the prosecution.8
The opponents of the rule urge that the exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence is appropriate only
to a tidy "fox-hunting" theory of criminal justice.
The community will permit the game only so long
as gamblers and other petty crooks are involved.
"If a murderer, bank robber or kidnapper should
go free in the face of his guilt," writes one critic,
"the public would surely arise and condemn the
helplessness of the courts against the depradations
of the outlaws." 9 The rule destroys respect for
law because it provides the spectacle of the courts
letting the guilty go free. -
The rule attempts to redress a violation of law
without the time-honored method of direct com-
plaint and trial on a carefully defined issue.'
0 The
6 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585,
587 (1926).
7 The proposed indirect and unnatural method is as
follows: "Titus, you have been found guilty of conduct-
ing a lottery; Flavius, you have confessedly violated
the constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment
for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no! We
shall let you both go free. We shall not punish Flavius
directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction.
This is our way of teaching people like Flavius to
behave, and incidentally of securing respect for the
Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution
is not to strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off
somebody else who broke something else." 8 WXGMORE,
EviDnNcz §2184, at 40 (3d ed. 1940).
8 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 23, 150 N.E. 585,
588 (1926).
9 Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL
L.Q. 337, 379 (1939). This article presents a well
argued case against the exclusionary rule. Another very
good statement in the same vein is Waite, Judges and
the Crime Burden, 54 MicH. L. REv. 169 (1955).
10 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 755 (1951)
(Jackson, J.); Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by
Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479 (1922).
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procedure looking toward exclusion of evidence
interrupts, delays, and confuses the main issue at
hand-the trial of the accused. The principal
proceding may be turned into a trial of the police
rather than of the defendant.
Furthermore, it is argued that the social danger
of police excesses is greatly exaggerated.' The
police are restrained by their own discipline and
by the political power in the community. They will
take pains not to go beyond the limits of social
tolerance. Only the guilty suffer or profit by admis-
-sion or exclusion of evidence, the innocent have
little to fear. 2 The guilty whose privacy is invaded
do not suffer harm as do the innocent in a similar
circumstance.'3 "He who has made his home a den
of thieves, a distillery for the manufacture of
contraband liquor, a warehouse for infernal
machines, or a safety deposit box for forged
documents... has not sustained the damages when
its sanctity is invaded, as has the citizen who has
maintained that sanctity."'14
Finally, the case against the rule makes the
most serious assertion of all: The rule does not
succeed in its principal aim: to discourage illegal
police aktion. The police, it is said, are not con-
cerned with convictions in an important degree. A
failure to convict does not touch the officer in his
person or his pocketbook."5 Professional law en-
forcement training is not iffected by the exclusion-
ary rule." Many states which employ it are most
backward in providing for police education. With-
out instruction most well-meaning policemen
remain unaware of the law. Abusive police, of
course, will be deterred by nothing. Officers will
find illegal practices useful because of the dues
which they reveal, although the item actually
taken may not be used in court." Illegal searches
are not less frequent than illegal arrests in the
jurisdictions which embrace the rule, yet an
illegal search does forbid the use of evidence, but
the illegal arrest does not affect the courts' power
to try the defendant. 8
Most disturbing is the argument that if the
police are subject to the restrictions of the exclu-
sionary rule they cannot obtain the convictions
"18 WiGuoRE, EVIDENCE §2184 (3d ed. 1940).
" Plumb, op. cit. supra note 9 at 371.
1" Id. at 386.
1"Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 398, 236
Pac. 1019, 1021 (1925).
Is Waite, op. cit. supra note 9, at 194.
16 Ibid.
17 Plumb, op. cit. supra note 9, at 380.
is Waite, op. cit. supra note 9, at 193.
necessary to carry out their law enforcement
function, and if they cannot obtain such convic-
tions they will be tempted to harass suspects, to
inflict extra-legal punishments. "The exclusionary
rile," wrote Professor Waite, "has driven the
police to methods less desirable than those for
which the judges shut truth from the jury's ears."'19
The case against the rule is an impressive one.
In spite of the force of argument, I submit that
the rule should be retained where it is in force
and should be adopted where it is not now re-
spected. Some of the arguments against the rule
are unsound. Some can be met by measures other
than abandoning the rule. The disadvantages
which the rule does entail are worth the price
which must be paid. The exclusionary evidence
rule is morally correct and appropriate to a free
society. It is a rule naturally suggested by the
Constitution itself. It insures that the issues
respecting defendants' rights are raised and
litigated frequently, without great inconvenience.
It is the most effective remedy we possess to deter
police lawlessness.
A moral position of a high order gives support
to the rule. It is unseemly that the government
should with one hand forbid certain police conduct
and yet, at the same time, attempt to convict
accused persons through use of the fruits of the
very conduct which is forbidden. As Mr. Justice
Holmes put it in his Olmstead dissent:
"It is also iesirable that the Government
sfiould not itself foster and pay for other crimes,
when they are the means by which the evidence
is to be*obtained.... I can attach no importance
to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly
accepts and pays and announces that in the
future it will pay for the fruits. We have to
choose, and for my part I think it a less evil,
that some criminal should escape than the
- Government should play an ignoble part.'
2
0
And Mr. Justice Brandeis, also dissenting in
Olmstead, insisted that the use of illegal evidence
"is denied in order to maintain respect for law;
in order to promote confidence in the administra-
tion of justice; in order to preserve the judicial
process from contamination."
2
19 Id. at 196.
20 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470
(1928).
21 Id. at 484.
The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
has written as follows:
"One of the quickest ways for any law enforcement
officer to bring public disrepute upon himself, his
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The moral point not only rests upon an ethical
judgment that governmental hypocrisy is an evil
to be avoided for its own sake, but also it takes
into account the serious undermining of trust in
government which is an unavoidable consequence
of any scheme permitting the state to. benefit from
unlawful conduct. Surely the government is a
teacher, particularly in a society which leaves large
areas of life for private planning and action. Public
conduct becomes the model for private behavior.
Few things are more subversive of free institutions
than a mistrust of official integrity. When the
police themselves break the law and other agencies
of government eagerly reach for the benefits which
flow from the breach, it is difficult for the citizenry
to .believe that the government truly meant to
forbid the conduct in the first place. In our common
speech we often refer to our officials with words of
"otherness." How often do we say, "they" will
tax us, "they" will appoint the police chief, or
"they" will pass a law. It is corrosive of the vitally
necessary trust in government if we all understand
that "they" do not abide by the law which "they"
assert. The conviction that all government is
staffed by self-seeking hypocrites is easy to instill
and difficult to erase.
No one has insisted on this point more eloquently
than Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter. "Our
Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher," wrote Mr. Justice Brandeis.
"For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law;... it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal
law the end justifies the means-to declare that
the Government may commit crimes in order
to secure the conviction of a private criminal-
would bring terrible retribution. Against that
pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely
set its face. '*2
Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it in these words:
"The contrast between morality professed by
organization and the entire profession is to be found
guilty of a violation of civil rights. Our people may
tolerate many mistakes of both intent and perform-
ance, but, with unerring instinct, they know that
when any person is intentionally deprived of his
constitutional rights those responsible have com-
mitted no ordinary offense. A crime of this nature,
if subtly encouraged by failure to condemn and
punish, certainly leads down the road to totali-
tarianism." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 1-2
(September 1952).
22 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928)
(dissenting opinion).
society and immorality practiced on its behalf
makes for contempt of law. Respect for law
cannot be turned off and on as though it were
a hot-water faucet."23
The use of illegal evidence involves the courts,
the branch of government most dependent upon
popular respect, in a kind of ratification of illegal
conduct. Judge Traynor of the Supreme Court of
California has observed, "The success of the law-
less venture depends entirely on the court's
lending its aid by allowing the evidence to be
introduced."24 When the prosecutor takes evidence
gained by the lawless enforcement of the law and,
places it before a court, that court by accepting
the offer of proof becomes inevitably drawn into
the lawlessness. At least, many of the community's
most scrupulous and noble will see it so. Judge
Condon of Rhode Island has made the point in
these words: "If courts receive evidence knowing
that it has been unconstitutionally obtained,
they... give judicial countenance to the govern-
ment's violation of the Constitution. " 25  Listen
once more to a sentence from Holmes: "If the
existing code does not permit district attorneys
to have a hand in such dirty business it does not
permit the judge to allow such iniquities to
succeed." 26 The exclusionary rule dissociates the
court from any police policy of systematic viola-
tion of law.
In the federal courts the exclusionary rule is
grounded in the provisions of the Fourth Amend-
ment. In part, this constitutional position was
taken because the justices in Weeks v. United
States embraced the view that the courts, by
permitting the use of illegally obtained evidence,
came to participate in the violation of the offend-
ing federal police officer and hence to violate the
Constitution themselves. Mr. Justice Day,
speaking for a unanimous court, wrote concerning
the Fourth Amendment:
"This protection is equally extended to the
action of the Government and officers of the
law acting under it. To sanction such proceed-
ings would be to affirm by judicial decision a
manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the
prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for
2 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 759 (1959)
(dissenting opinion).
21 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 445. 282 P.2d
905. 912 (1955).
25 State v. Olynick, 113 A.2d 123, 131 (R.I. 1955)
(dissenting opinion).




the protection of the people against such
unauthorized action. '"
The point about ratification becomes even more
persuasive if we take a look at the facts of the
1955 case, People v. Cahan, in which the Supreme
Court of California overturned a practice of many
years standing and adopted the exclusionary rule:
"Gerald Wooters, an officer attached to the
intelligence unit of that department, testified
that after securing the permission of the chief of
police to make microphone installations at two
places occupied by defendants, he, Sergeant
Keeler, and Officer Phillips one night at about
8:45, entered one 'house through the side win-
dow of the first floor,' and that he 'directed the
officers to place a listening device under a chest
of drawers.' Another officer made recordings
and transcriptions of the conversations that
came over in a nearby garage. About a month
later, at Officer Wooters' direction, a similar
device was surreptitiously installed in another
house and receiving equipment was also set up
in a nearby garage"28
When I first considered the Cahan case three
years ago I was moved to write:
"This police conduct is not only an example of
illegality, it is illegality elaborately planned
with the connivance of the Los Angeles Chief
of Police. It is not the case of the over-eager
rookie misjudging the fine lines of the law of
arrest. It is constitutional violation as a matter
of police policy.' ' 9
So it still seems to me. The violation of constitu-
tional rights in the case took place because the
chief of police thought the evidence would be used
z Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914).
See also the statement of the Delaware Supreme
Court in Rickards v. State, 45 De. 573, 585, 77 A.2d
199, 205 (1950), to the effect that as long as constitu-
tional guarantees exist "we have no choice but to use
every means at our disposal to preserve those
guarantees."
Another constitutional point has been made. "To
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Govemment upon the privacy of the individual, what-
ever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in
a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such
intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth."
Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928). This point has not fared well
with scholars. See 8 ,VioMoRE, EVIDENcE §2184, at 31
(3d ed. 1940) and Allen, The Exdusionary Bule in the
American Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J. Cane. L.,
C. & P.S. 246, 250 (1961).
U People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d
905, 911-12 (1955).
29Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and
Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 65, 75-76 (1957).
in court. Otherwise there would have been little
point to the planning of the trespass. Had it
permitted the use of the evidence, the court would
not only have sanctioned the infraction at hand
but also encouraged other violations.
California is not alone in moving to adopt the
rule because police officers were tempted to un-
constitutional action by the availability of the
evidence in court. The 1950 opinion of the Supreme
Court of Delaware which recognized the rule in
that state speaks of safeguarding against "delib-
erate invasion."30
Most constitutional or statutory restrictions
on police conduct are decisions by legislators or
constitution-makers that it is better for some
guilty persons to go free than for the police to
behave in forbidden fashion. They are, however,
decisions in the abstract. The exclusionary rule
has the advantage of applying the constitutional
or statutory decision to a particular case. The
second argument for the rule is thus that the use
of the rule is a natural consequence of the re-
strictive principle. The rule is needed to make the
constitutional or statutory safeguards something
real. At the New York State Constitutioral
Convention of 1938, United States Senator Robert
F. Wagner spoke about this point:
"Mr. Chairman, I profoundly beleve that a
search and seizure guarantee wkich does not
carry with it the exclusion of evidence obtained
by its violation is an emrCY gesture; it is an
amendment which will be wholly ineffective in
protecting the constitutional right of privacy
which we seek to confer. If I may borrow a
phrase of Justice Cardozo's which has not been
quoted before, it speaks the word of promise to
the ear and it breaks it to the hope. I profoundly
believe that an amendment which does not
provide for the exclusion of evidence is not only
ineffective but it is dangerou§; it is dangerous
because it will promote the. spectacle, unfor-
tunately not unknown in our time, of con-
stitutional rights which have their meaning on
paper and on paper alone. Let no one who cares
for civil liberty discount this danger. To guaran-
tee civil rights in theory and permit constituted
authority to deny them in practice, no matter
how justifiable the ends may be or may seem,
is to imperil the very foundation on which our
Democracy rests."'
33 Rickards v. State, 45 Del. 573, 77 A.2d 199, 205
(1950).
31N.Y. STATE CONST. CONV., REVISED REcoRD
559 (1938).
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Thirdly, the exclusionary rule gives every pros-
ecuted person an opportunity to vindicate search
and seizure principles for the benefit of all, insofar
as violations of these principles have resulted in
the production of evidence against the accused.
The accused has a motive to challenge the police
overreaching. He need not resort to another pro-
ceeding or hire another lawyer. The rule assures a
great deal of judicial attention to these questions.
The law of arrest and illegal searches is undevel-
oped in states without the rule. Many legal ques-
tions about proper police conduct cannot be
answered in New York because the New York
courts admit illegally obtaiined evidence and hence
have little chance to pass on questions of police
behavior. The questions have not been resolved
by legislation. As a by-product of California's
recent acceptance of the rule, great clarification
and modification of the law of arrest and search
and seizure has taken place. The task is not done
unless there is an easy opportunity for litigation.
The fourth principal reason supporting the
exclusionary evidence rule is a kind of counsel of
despair. The other remedies are totally unsatis-
fa-tory.n On the other hand there are reasons to
beliere that the exclusionary rule has an important
practical influence.-
An illegJl arrest or search may violate the crimi-
nal law. Yet, very few criminal prosecutions of
those engaging 1a such conduct can be found in
the reported cases--a startling fact when one
considers the great numuber of reported instances
of police misconduct. Prosecutions must be
brought by district attorney.-, who are not likely
to take a position opposed to the front line law
enforcement personnel. Prosecutors are judged
in terms of their record of successful prosecutions.
They cannot afford the hostility of the police.
Even if a willing district attorney were to be
found, he would probably have a pessimistic view
of his chances to succeed in a prosecution. In the
overwhelming number of cases, the jury box will
hold more who sympathize with the officer than
with his victim.
Such evidence as we have suggests that tort
suits for trespass or false arrest are ineffective
either as deterrents against the police or as instru-
ments for compensating the injured persons. Again,
12 Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of
Indhivdual Rights, 39 MiN. L. Rzv. 493 (1955);
Note, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of
the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. REv.
493 (1952).
juries in such cases are not apt to be very sym-
pathetic to the run-of-the-mill dope peddler,
petty thief, or gambler against whom the over-
whelming number of police infractions are com-
mitted. The typical plaintiff in such actions has
some disadvantages which flow from the rules
surrounding an action for false imprisonment or
false arrest. Proof of prior reputation may be
admitted to impeach credibility, to mitigate dam-
ages by demonstrating that a criminal record has
already destroyed the plaintiff's reputation, and
to show that a proper cause existed to support the
arrest. In a good many cases, the potential plain-
tiff will have been convicted and imprisoned before
the tort action can be started. The conviction
itself may establish conclusively the presumption
of proper cause for the arrest. This plaintiff will
find it difficult to leave prison in order to testify
and, in some jurisdictions, the civil death statutes
suspend the right to sue after a conviction.
Even if he should succeed, the plaintiff in a
tort action may find himself possessed of a judg-
ment against a person unable to pay. Police are
neither wealthy nor bonded. Inability to collect
damages may not present the biggest problem.
Actual damages may be quite small-inadequate
to deter any officer or to encourage the victim to
bring suit. Compensatory damages in the case of
an illegal search or arrest of short duration will be
an insignificant amount. Punitive damages may
not be available. Infractions will seem to cause a
very slight harm, hardly worth the payment of
money. In short, the guilty cannot sue and the
innocent will not find it profitable. Thus, injury
to the "peace of mind" of the individual and the
harm done to the community-the truly serious
consequences of police misconduct-escape redress.
Tort recovery from the individual officer and
criminal sanctions against him are disadvan-
tageous from another point of view. If the criminal
and tort law operate too efficiently against indi-
vidual officers, the officers may become over-
cautious. Because tort damages are proportioned
to harm rather than fault, tort suits may end in a
great injustice to the policeman. A relatively slight
infraction of the rules could result in very great
harm to the victim.
The inadequacy of the conventional remedies
has led to a series of suggestions to supplement or
replace them. Two leading commentators have
urged that the tort law be changed to provide for
minimum liquidated damages and for govern-
[Vol. 52
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mental liability. They also urge that the position
of the plaintiff in the tort action be improved by
restricting the use of character information against
him and permitting him to bring suit while in
custody.P These changes would enhance the use-
fulness of the tort action in controlling official
overreaching by the police department. Govern-
mental liability would assure compensation to
the victim. It would not too harshly penalize the
offending officer. It is assumed that the govern-
mental unit would take steps to eliminate police
guilty of serious infractions or of continued minor
ones. The provision for minimum liquidated
damages would ensure payment to persons of
damaged reputations. It would also provide re-
covery in cases involving little actual damage and
in cases where the harm caused by police mis-
conduct is difficult to translate into money. Such
proposals are very attractive. Were they a reality,
the case in favor of the exclusionary rule would be
much weakened.
Our aim should be to provide a system which
could tolerate isolated instances of over-
zealousness, if they were promptly and justly
corrected by sanctions proportioned to the fault
of the officer, and which would provide compensa-
tion for injury to the victim. These objectives
are consistent with the proposals to put financial
responsibility upon the units of government rather
than the individual officer. Yet I cannot believe
that governmental units will bear any substantial
expenditure to compensate the most probable
victims of illegal police misconduct-the bums,
drifters, petty crooks, or big-time operators-in
the face of the pressing public need for schools,
hospitals, roads, and yes, prisons. Until some
governmental unit somewhere is in fact giving
adequate civil recovery for unconstitutional law
enforcement, I retain my stubborn doubt whether
the idea can be made to work.
Imposing liability on government units, more-
over, will not completely deter the state from
engaging in unconstitutional practices. It may be
very attractive for state officials, acting according
to a calculus of police values, to violate now and
pay later.
The proposal for a civil rights office, independent
of the regular prosecutor, for prosecution of offenses
committed by police officers, has several dis-
3 Foote, op. cit. supra note 32; Barrett, Exclusion of
Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches and Seizures, A
Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIp. L. Rnv. 565
(1955).
advantagesO' First, it does not provide for com-
pensation to the injured party. In this respect it
is no better than the exclusionary rule. Secondly,
it either puts the sanction directly on the police
officer, by making him liable to prosecution for
each instance of misconduct, or leaves prosecu-
tion so haphazard that it will fail as a deterrent.
Administrative elimination of the unfit for re-
peated disregard of civil rights is to be preferred
to the caution which might result from harsh
punishment of the individual officer for a single
misdeed. Thirdly, even if direct punishment is
thought useful, I doubt whether many juries will
convict a policeman who has violated the civil
rights of a gangster.
Systematic discipline within the police depart-
ment itself would be a splendid sanction if it were
practiced. We just do not have examples of cities
or other governmental units which have insisted
that departments get rid of police officers who
refuse to obey the search and seizure rules.'
The remedies which we have neither deter nor
compensate. The exclusionary principle does not
make the injured person whole; does it, in fact, act
as a deterrent?
We cannot make an answer irrefutably sup-
ported by the facts. The kind of social investigation
necessary to convince the already committed has
not been made. The pilot studies of the American
Bar Foundation are reported to be inconclusive
on this issue."8 The student editors of the North-
western University Law Review made a statistical
study in 1952 of the operation of the rule in a
branch of the Municipal Court of Chicago.E7 The
statistics demonstrated that in from seventy to
eighty-five per cent of the gambling cases motions
to suppress evidence on the ground of illegal
search were granted. Motions succeeded in about
twenty-five per cent of the narcotics cases, and
in about nineteen per cent of the prosecutions for
3 Peterson, Restrictions in the Law of Search and
Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 46,62 (1957); Note, Judicial
Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L. J.
144,163 (1948).
5The internal disciplinary machinery in Phil-
adelphia "has not yet been used in the case of an illegal
search or arrest." Note, Philadelphia Police Practice
and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. R1v. 1182, 1211
(1952). This note also contains a useful estimate of the
available remedies for illegal arrest. Id. at 1206-12.
36 Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal
State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN.
L. REv. 1083, 1145 n.226 (1959).
37 Note, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement
of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L.
REv. 493, 497-99 (1952).
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carrying concealed weapons. The data, partial
and inconclusive as it is, suggests that the Chicago
police engaged in a great deal of harassment of
gamblers by bringing cases which they knew they
could not win. In these cases they paid little atten-
tion to the rules of law. The lower percentage of
successful motions to suppress made with respect
to the more serious crimes, narcotics and carrying
concealed weapons, suggests, however, that the
police comply with the law in more instances when
they intend to get a conviction. Perhaps the
exclusionary rule has an influence here. At any
rate, any study of the Chicago police must take
into account the fact that one is, indeed, studying
the Chicago police department, a department
which has stood in need of a reformation which
cannot be accomplished by legal rules alone.
Any attempt to assess the impact of the ex-
clusionary rule is vexed by troublesome questions
of cause and effect.3 Many states with the rule of
admissibility enjoy police compliance with the
law, but the very infrequency of police excesses
may be a reason why the rule of admissibility is
tolerated. The police may control their behavior
for fear the exclusionary rule might tempt the
local Supreme Court if unconstitutional police
conduct were to become a serious problem. In
California the exclusionary rule was adopted for
the very reason that outrageous police work has
become common under the rule of admissibility.
In some states which embrace the exclusionary
principle, police behavior is of the worst sort. Yet
we know that bad law enforcement depends on a
great many things in addition to a rule of evi-
dence. If the situation is bad in a state having the
rule, abolition may make things a great deal worse.
If statistical proof is lacking that the rule
modifies police conduct, what evidence do we have
that the rule has an effect on police?
In the first place, the arguments of police
spokesmen against the exclusionary evidence rule
give an indication of reluctance to change police
practice. For example, Chief Parker of Los Angeles
said after the Cahan case that now the police could
arrest only if they had sufficient information to
constitute "probable cause" that the suspect was
guilty.39 The law to which the Chief adverted had
been in force in California for a long time but,
with the new rule of exclusion, the police would
38 See the estimate of the effect of the exclusionary
rule, especially in California after the Cahan case, in
Kamisar, op. cit. supra note 36, at 1145-58.
39Id. at 1158.
apparently have to take it into account. There
would be little reason to complain of the substan-
tive rules unless the exclusionary rule made them
relevant to police action.
In the second place, it seems reasonable that
the rule will generate pressure upon enforcement
officers to improve the quality of their work. I
believe that the police officers themselves are
interested in obtaining convictions. Men have an
interest in the final product of their work. How-
ever that may be, prosecuting attorneys are cer-
tainly interested in convictions. They can be
counted upon to exercise an influence toward
obedience of the law. Public opinion may join the
prosecutors in a demand for more careful enforce-
ment if citizens witness many persons released
because of official infractions.
40
Thirdly, we can look at police training schools
and discover that a great deal of emphasis is placed
on the rules of arrest and search and seizure in the
schools of the exclusionary jurisdictions. Mr.
Justice Murphy's inquiry, described in his dissent
in Wolf v. Colorado, has often been cited.4a The
Metropolitan Police Department of the District
of Columbia received a series of lectures on how
to operate under the law after the decision in
Mallory v. United States, a United States Supreme
Court decision excluding from evidence in federal
courts any confession made during a period of
illegal detention. 2 In a speech to the International
Association of Chiefs of Police in September, 1959,
Mr. Quinn Tamm, Assistant Director of the F.B.I.,
said:
"We must present in our schools thoughts
such as these for the cogitation of our trainees:
"What does it profit a police officer to dis-
cover and apprehend a person responsible for a
crime if he does so in a manner so reprehensible
to the rule of law that the evidence is inadmis-
sible in court and consequently worthless in
bringing him to justice? What good is a con-
fession, even one which conclusively is shown
to be true by after-discovered evidence, if it is
declared inadmissible in evidence because the
court deems that it was involuntarily obtained?
We must emphasize the fact that the short-cut
of an involuntary confession becomes a boom-
40 Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federal-
ism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1950).
4' 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949).
12 THOMAS, THE MALLORY RULE: PRESENT STATUS
AND ErFFzcT 20 (unpublished paper on file in the
Columbia University Law School Library, 1960).
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erang which flies back and hits not only the
officer himself but his entire department and
the community as a whole .... 43
Finally, we sometimes find statements, worthy
of our attention, which assert that the rule has a
corrective effect. Recently, Mr. Justice Stewart
of the United States Supreme Court stated that
the weight of the available evidence supports the
proposition that the exclusionary rule is useful.
"But pragmatic evidence of a sort is not
wanting. The federal courts themselves have
operated under the exclusionary rule of Weeks
for almost half a century; yet it has not been
suggested either that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has thereby been rendered in-
effective, or that the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts has thereby been
disrupted.""
Mr. Myron G. Ehrlich, a Washington, D. C.,
lawyer, has reported that since the Mallory case
magistrates are available for preliminary exami-
nation twenty-four hours a day in the District.4
The Washington Post has reported its opinion that
the Washington police have exhibited more dil-
igence in complying with the law since Mallory."'
Governor Brown, while he was still Attorney
General of California, expressed his conviction
that the exclusionary rule had improved police
practice in California.0 Further, a reading of the
lower court opinions in the District of Columbia
leaves the writer with the impression that police
practices there have changed after Mallory.s
Let me take just a few more moments to make
very brief responses to propositions advanced by
opponents of the rule.
Opponents say that the police will act illegally
to obtain dues although, under the rule, any
evidence taken by the illegality could not be used.
The point raises a problem under the rule but
Reported in 8 Civil Liberties in New York, No. 2,
p. 4, col. 5 (November 1959). This paper is the official
organ of the New York Civil Liberties Union.
"Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
46 THox s, op. cit. supra note 42, at 23. Thomas also
reports that Senator Hennings of Missouri held the
opinion that the Mallory rule has changed police prac-
rice in the District of Columbia; that the United States
Park Police claim to have made changes in their mode
of operation. Id. at 24. A lawyer in the criminal prac-
tice, Mr. James R. Scullen, disagreed and asserted
that police methods in the District are unchanged by
Mallory. Id. at 23.
4, Washington Post and Times Herald, June 14,
1959, p. El, col. 1-6.0 Letter republished in Kamisar, op. cit. supra note
36, at 1158.
48 THoyAs, op. cit. supra note 42, at 3.
not an argument against it. The exclusionary
principle applies to the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" as well as to the tree itself.4 The problem
is how to discover what evidence is the "fruit"
of illegality in order to suppress it. The answer
lies in requiring the police to disclose the source of
offered proof if it is requested.w.
Opponents say that the police will, themselves,
impose extra-judicial punishments, such as beat-
ings, if they are prevented from convicting the
most dangerous. Surely no community ought to
permit continual assaults by officers, no matter
how lofty the motive with which the blows are
struck. I cannot believe such conduct would long
be tolerated.
Opponents say that the exclusionary rule is
itself overly technical and arbitrary. They are
right. That the rule is somewhat capricious is an
argument for improvement, not abolition. The
United States Supreme Court only recently swept
away a lot of technical law concerning who has
standing to challenge illegal evidence. 51 The
deterrent effect of the rule will be increased
because of this development.
Opponents say that the rule is disruptive of the
main business of a trial. I am not persuaded. The
motion to suppress is properly made in advance.
Where a later determination is necessary or proper,
there is little in actual experience to suggest that
proceedings are unduly disturbed by the adminis-
tration of the rule.
Opponents say that the exclusionary rule inter-
feres wit& the process of getting at the truth at a
trial. They are right. Some evidence may be ex-
cluded which could have helped to establish the
facts. Yet, surely, a trial has purposes other than
to lay reality bare. A trial is a part of govern-
ment's teaching apparatus. Social values of the
greatest importance receive expression in the
court room. To reach a decision in accordance with
the truth is only one value which, in some circum-
stances, may have to bow before others.
A recently formulated criticism suggests that
the rule is deficient in that it gives a remedy for
invasions of privacy which are not as important
19 Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920).
50 United States v. Frankfeld, 100 F. Supp. 934
(D. Md. 1951), shows how difficult it is to get a hearing
on wiretapping allegations. The problem is discussed
in Note, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Wiretapping:
An Illusory Safeguard, 61 YALE L. J. 1221 (1952).
" Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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as other outrages which the exclusionary rule
cannot reach.
"An inherent characteristic of the exclusionary
rule is that it puts the greatest pressure to
conform to the rules regarding arrest and de-
tention. In its direct application, of course, the
rule comes into play only when a successful
police search has turned up evidence which is
to be offered at the trial. But even as a deterrent
it affects only those aspects of police illegality
which are likely to result in the acquisition of
physical evidence of guilt and are undertaken
for the purpose of securing the prosecution and
conviction of a suspected offender. Illegal
arrests which are designed to harass rather than
to prosecute, physical abuse of suspects or
persons in custody, unnecessary destruction of
property, illegal detentions which are not
motivated by a desire to secure confessions,
and similar serious forms of police illegality
are not affected by the rule or by the cognate
rule excluding coerced or illegally obtained
confessions. In short, the rule has a deterrent
impact only on illegal searches and those illegal
arrests to which searches are incident. And it
has impact on those procedures only in those
situations in which the police are proceeding
with the conscious purpose of securing evidence
to use in prosecuting the defendant."u
This passage contributes an important idea to
the discussion, but the argument does not speak
to the worth of the exclusionary rule. The passage
ought to be followed by a call to create better rem-
edies it; addition to the rule. To say that the ex-
clusionary rule cannot operate to deter all police
misconduct is not to say that the rule should be
abandoned. It should be supplemented.
The basic political problem of a free society is
the problem of controlling the public monopoly
of force. All the other freedoms, freedom of speech,
of assembly, of religion, of political action, pre-
suppose that arbitrary and capricious police action
has been restrained. Security in one's home and
person is the fundamental without which there
can be no liberty. The exclusionary rule is the
best and the most practical way for the law to
deter those officials who would make inroads upon
that security. It is morally right. It provides
frequent opportunities for litigation of the issues.
It is the best tool we have to give life to the
constitutional safeguards against unreasonable
52 Barrett, op. cit. supra note 4, at 54-55.
interferences by the professional agencies of law
enforcement.
ADDENDum
Since the preceding pages were written the Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that the
states are bound to exclude illegally obtained evi-
dence in state criminal trials.n The reasons given
for that decision are, of course, directly relevant
to the thesis of the present paper. First, the major-
ity of the Court affirmed that the exclusionary rule
is required by the Constitution itself. The rule was
said to be "a dear, specific, and constitutionally
required--even if judicially implied--deterrent
safeguard without insistence upon which the
Fourth Amendment would have been 'reduced to a
form of words'."" An interesting point about this
formulation is the fact that it does assert that the
exclusionary rule is a "deterrent safeguard." The
point is not simply that the Constitution requires
the rule without respect to its aspect as a deterrent
to police misconduct. Secondly, the opinion points
out, "If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law." Thirdly, the opinion
states, quoting from Fikins v. United Sk&, u
there is "pragmatic evidence of a sort" to warrant
a belief that the exclusionary rule does deter.
Fourthly, "Our decision, founded on reason and
truth, gives to the individual no more than that
which the Constitution guarantees him, to the
police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that
judicial integrity so necessary in the true adminis-
tration of justice.""6
One final reason was given by the Court. Because
the states, before Mapp, could use illegally seized
evidence and the federal prosecutors could not, an
unhappy temptation existed in some states.
"In non-exclusionary States, federal officers,
being human, were by it invited to and did, as
our cases indicate, step across the street to the
State's attorney with their unconstitutionally
seized evidence. Prosecution on the basis of that
evidence was then had in a-state court in utter
disregard of the enforceable Fourth Amendment.
If the fruits of an unconstitutional search had
been inadmissible in both state and federal
Mapp v. Ohio, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).
'AId. at 1688.
55 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
56 81 S. Ct. at 1694.
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courts, this inducement to evasion would have
been sooner eliminated.)'
'
Mr. Justice Black joined in the Court's opinion
but based his decision on the ground that the inter-
relationship between the Fourth and the Fifth
Amendments requires the application of the ex-
clusionary rule.
57 Id. at 1693.
The battle for the exclusionary evidence rule as a
principal weapon against police misconduct has
been won-for the moment, at least. In my view
the reasons in support of the rule dearly justify
the outcome. Whether the view is correct is now a
question to be put to experience. We have a chance
to determine whether we can operate law enforce-
ment agencies within the bounds of the constitu-
tional rights to privacy.
